Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect the rebuilding of the casino industry has had on the recovery efforts from Katrina. Design/methodology/approach -The paper uses quarterly data from four states affected by Katrina, and a simple OLS model to test the effect the casino industry has had on personal income in the states. Findings -The paper finds that the casino industry has had a statistically significant positive impact on the economic recovery in casino states relative to non-casino states.
Introduction
Most publicity on the recovery efforts from Katrina has focused on government. Few researchers or media reports have focused on particular industries or markets in general. Countless industries were damaged by Katrina. But the commercial casino industry in Louisiana (LA) and Mississippi (MS) may have been one of the most seriously impacted, as much of it was concentrated along the Gulf Coast and was all but destroyed.
The casino industry in MS represents the third largest commercial casino market in the USA, behind Las Vegas and Atlantic City. The Louisiana casino market is also significant. According to the American Gaming Association (AGA, 2005) , total gaming revenues in 2004 were $2.16 billion in LA and $2.78 billion in MS. The states raise a significant amount of tax revenue from the casinos: in 2004, $436 million in LA and $333 million in MS. The industry employs a sizable workforce: in 2004, over 20,000 employees in LA, and almost 29,000 in MS. Hurricanes Katrina (August 2005) and Rita (September 2005) devastated the casinos located on the Gulf Coast of Mississippi, in the New Orleans area, and in Lake Charles, LA.
The casino industry was one of the first to begin significant rebuilding immediately after Katrina and Rita [1] . Did the casino industry have a measurable positive impact on the states' recoveries? This is an interesting empirical question, considering how many people view the casino industry as parasitic and gambling as a zero-sum game.
In this paper, we develop a model to test the effect of the casino industry on the post-Katrina/Rita economies of LA and MS. We wish to test whether the casino industry is parasitic (and simply cannibalizes other industries) and has no net effect on the economy, or if it has served as an engine of economic growth. This issue can be addressed by testing whether the industry has had an effect on state-level growth after Katrina. We find that it has. Obviously, an empirical analysis of the casino industry is not going to be the final word on business and disaster recovery or the economic effects of casino gambling. But it is one piece of an interesting puzzle.
The paper is organized into four additional sections. In the next section, we briefly review the relevant literature. That discussion sets the stage for our empirical model, which is described in Section 3. Our model shows that the casino industry has had a significantly positive impact on the economic recovery. In Section 4, these empirical results are presented and discussed. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Literature review
Several journals have recently published special issues on Katrina. Among these published papers there are several which highlight the failure of the federal government's response to Katrina [2] . This paper makes a contribution to the "Katrina literature" because it examines the effects of a particular industry that was substantially damaged by Katrina. Aside from our own previous study (2008), we are unaware of other work that has focused on a particular industry hit by Katrina.
The literature on the economic and social effects of gambling and the casino industry is diverse; it includes work by economists, sociologists, psychologists, medical researchers, lawyers, and others. One aspect of the "economics of gambling" literature that is relevant to the Katrina disaster and the ongoing recovery is whether gambling in general and casinos in particular are "productive" for the economy. We provide a very brief background of this issue from the literature.
The legalization of casinos has been a controversial issue in US politics since the early 1990s, when states outside Nevada and New Jersey first started to legalize. Of course, politicians have looked to casino gambling as a means of raising tax and fee revenues in an era of increased fiscal stress and irresponsibility. The casino industry has argued that it brings jobs, capital investment, and tax benefits. Along with the proponents' touting of potential economic benefits, there are potential social costs that result from pathological gambling behavior, which may be largely the result of legalized casino gambling.
There are real potential economic benefits of legalized gambling. For example, when the casino industry grows, there are significant amounts of capital investment, labor demand, etc. Yet, these effects have not yet been examined by economists. However, two studies have examined the general economic growth effects of casino gambling at a state level.
In 1998, we published a study that examined the relationship between state-level economic growth and state-level casino activity. We did an empirical analysis using a modified Granger causality technique on per capita income and casino revenue data from 1991 to 1996. We found statistically significant evidence that casino revenues spurred economic growth. In our more recent study (2007), we found that there were no such effects at a state level when examining data from 1991 to 2005. We interpret these seemingly contradictory results as showing that casinos may have a short-run economic stimulus effect to a state's economy, but in the longer-run, these effects decrease [3] .
In an earlier study of Katrina (2008), we found evidence that the casino industry in LA and MS has had a significantly positive effect on the affected states' economies. This result is consistent with our findings discussed above, that there is at least a short-term stimulus from the casino industry. However, the sample period in the previous paper was limited to mid-2006, did not include any control states (i.e. states damaged by Katrina, but without commercial casinos), and the data were not weighted. The current paper is an extension of our earlier paper and corrects for the previous study's shortcomings. Other than our previous work, we are aware of no other papers that have empirically examined the economic effects of the casino industry at the state level, or of any industry in the wake of Katrina.
Despite the few empirical studies of the casino industry, there is a significant amount of anecdotal evidence of its positive economic effects. In MS, for example, the introduction of casinos in 1992 was clearly a catalyst for economic growth in the state. In 1994 Congressional testimony, the director of the Tunica County, MS, Chamber of Commerce testified that the casinos in his county had been responsible for an unbelievable economic stimulus (Franklin, 1994) . In Biloxi, MS, the casino industry revitalized what had become a stagnant coastal town. Without the casino industry, one wonders if any industry would be in Biloxi. Do casinos matter as much in other states that are not so poor? Evidence in the other ten states with casinos is mixed, but new states (e.g. Kansas, Kentucky, and Massachusetts) are currently debating casino legalization. Obviously, many politicians and citizens believe the benefits of casino gambling outweigh the costs.
Perhaps, the most important economic benefit of casino gambling is one that has been almost entirely ignored by researchers. When a new business opens, whether it is a casino, a movie theater, or a mall, consumers benefit from transactions. If this was not the case, then there would be no transactions. Walker (2007a, p. 14) suggests that these consumption benefits from casinos probably outweigh any tax or employment benefits from the industry. Unfortunately, there have not been any empirical estimates of these consumer benefits and they are typically neglected in cost-benefit analyses of the casino industry. This is probably the result of casino gambling usually being considered to be a fiscal policy tool, rather than an issue of consumer sovereignty, property rights, and freedom.
On the cost side of the casino debate, researchers have struggled with identifying and quantifying the social costs of pathological gambling behavior (Walker, 2007b) . Even the casino industry admits that a small percentage of the population develops problem gambling behavior, and such behavior may cause social costs, such as crime, treatment costs, and legal costs. The magnitude and monetary value of such costs are hotly debated in the literature. Unfortunately, this type of research is in its infancy, and there are to date no reliable estimates of the social costs of gambling [4] .
Another area of the gambling literature that is critical to understanding the role of the casino industry in a post-Katrina economy deals with the nature of gambling as an activity. In contrast to our argument above that the primary benefit of legalized casino gambling comes from consumers' benefits, some researchers have argued that gambling at a casino or otherwise may be a socially wasteful activity that produces nothing of value.
Market-based "disaster relief"
Gambling is, they argue, a zero-sum game, at best. As an example, consider Grinols and Omorov (1996) Other anti-gambling advocates have made the similar argument. Common among the papers in which the argument is made is a citation of an old version of Samuelson's (1976, p. 425) economics principles text, in which he writes that gambling "creates no new money or goods," and "when pursued beyond the limits of recreation . . . gambling subtracts from the national income". Walker (2007a, pp. 152-7) discusses the DUP issue in detail and shows why gambling cannot be considered to be "rent-seeking" or a DUP activity any more than watching a movie or baseball game can be. Such views of gambling essentially ignore the consumers' benefits from the activity and the value of non-tangible goods and services. The recent explosion in popularity of profession poker on TV provides a clear refutation of Grinols and Omorov's DUP argument. Clearly, even professional poker can be viewed as providing entertainment value.
One final issue from the gambling literature that deserves attention relates to whether the casino industry simply "cannibalizes" other industries. Gambling critics such as Grinols (2004, p. 73) have argued that the casino industry grows mainly at the expense of other industries. The result of growth in the industry, then, results in a decline in other industries with no net change in the overall economy. This view is widespread among casino researchers, but it fails to recognize one basic characteristic of market economics: all industries and firms compete for business, and this competition is a socially and economically productive force. Furthermore, such cannibalization is arguably beneficial, as all economic growth entails some measure of cannibalization; resources are expected to move from less productive to more productive sectors [5] .
Although the gambling literature is still developing, many policymakers and voters appear to be convinced that there are potential benefits from legalized casinos.
Data and model
The casino industries in LA and MS were devastated by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For example, just prior to the storms, there were over 17,000 slot machine positions in MS Gulf Coast casinos. As of December 2005, there were only 3,440 working slot positions. By October 2006, that number had grown back to about 10,600 Table 2 ). Casino revenues in New Orleans area casinos were about $54 million in July 2005. By November 2005, they had crept back up to about $30 million. Casinos in Lake Charles, LA, also suffered significant revenue losses. Within a year or so after Katrina/Rita, revenues increased to above pre-storm levels. These data paint an interesting picture of just how strong and quick the industry's recovery was, relative to many other businesses, which, even years later, had failed to rebuild.
Data
We are interested in testing the econometric relationship between the casino industry and economic growth in Katrina-affected states. In order to have a control for the model, we include the two states with casinos (LA and MS) [6] , as well as two states without commercial casinos (Alabama (AL) and Texas (TX)) [7] . We collected quarterly data on state-level personal income and casino revenues, to measure economic growth and casino activity, respectively.
Although previous analyses have used per capita income as the variable measuring economic growth, we instead use personal income, for two reasons. First, there was a significant amount of migration caused by Katrina. It is unclear exactly how effectively per capita income would reflect such migration. For example, if there is a significant amount of migration out of LA and MS then per capita income measures may actually rise as a result of Katrina, if the loss in income is relatively less than the population decrease. Other possible anomalies led us to avoid using per capita income. Second, personal income data are available quarterly, whereas per capita income data are not. The personal income data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and are seasonally adjusted.
Casino revenues are the best measure of the volume of gambling activity. These data are net of payments to players for winning bets. Not only do these revenues represent consumer spending and tourism, but also the capital reinvestment, labor demand, etc. associated with rebuilding the casinos. Casino revenue data are provided by the respective state gaming regulatory agencies [8] .
Both data sets (personal income and casino revenues) are quarterly, and are adjusted for inflation. The data set runs from January 1997 through February 2007, the most recent period for which data are available[9]. Since we are using quarterly data, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita occur in the same period (March 2005). Since both storms affected the LA and MS casino industries, we examine their effects jointly. Katrina had the most serious impact on LA and MS, and to a lesser extent, AL and FL; Rita affected mostly LA and TX.
We want the emphasis in the model to be on the states most seriously affected by the hurricanes, so we weighted the personal income and casino revenue data. Our primary goal was to keep TX from dominating the model, as it has a significantly larger personal income than the other states in the model, but was not as seriously affected by the storms.
In order to weight the data, we obtained a list of counties (or parishes, for LA) declared by FEMA to be most seriously damaged by Katrina and Rita. FEMA offers aid in the form of public assistance or individual assistance. The most seriously affected counties (parishes) qualify for both public and individual assistance. We weight the personal income and casino revenue data by the percentage of the state's counties (parishes) that qualified for both public and individual assistance as a result of the hurricanes. The weights are shown in the right-most column of 
Model
In order to test whether the casino industry has had a significant effect on the recovery from Katrina, we posit a simple OLS model to explain personal income at the state level. We view the model in this paper as being a significant extension to our previous work, for three reasons. In this paper, we:
(1) include a control sample of non-casino states; (2) weight the income and revenue data by affected counties; and (3) include an additional year (four periods) of post-Katrina data.
As a result, the model in this paper provides a much better picture of the relationship between the casino industry and state economies with respect to the Katrina disaster.
Obviously there are many components of personal income. However, such series are explained, to an extent, by their own past values [11] . After an analysis of the series' correlograms and unit root tests, we conclude that personal income and casino revenues are generated by AR (2) and AR (1) processes, respectively. We choose to model these time dependencies directly, rather than simply adding a time trend in the model. Therefore, the model includes casino revenue (t 2 1), personal income (t 2 1), and personal income (t 2 2) as explanatory variables.
The model includes a series of dummy variables for the affected states: AL, LA, and MS. TX and FL were also affected by Katrina/Rita. TX is the omitted dummy. FL was omitted from the analysis entirely, as explained above.
We include a series of interaction terms: state dummies with a Katrina dummy (value of 1 in March 2005, 0 otherwise) to allow the state personal income intercepts to adjust as a result of Katrina/Rita. By interacting the Katrina dummy with the various state dummies, we are able to gauge the differential (before and after) effect of Katrina/Rita on the various states' personal incomes. Including the Katrina dummy directly as well would muddy the waters considerably, so the dummy is not included in the model by itself [12] .
Finally, we include two variables to account for the effect of the commercial casino industry on the states' personal incomes. Casino revenue measures current period net casino revenues, and is a measure of the economic activity in the industry. The second variable is an interaction term between casino revenue and the post-Katrina dummy [13] . This variable measures the contribution of the casino industry to state personal income after Katrina. This important effect is above and beyond the "normal" effect found in the casino revenue variable, and is the primary focus of the model.
Admittedly, this is a very simple model of state personal income; we are estimating current period personal income by using its own past values, as well as data on casino revenue, and a series of dummy and interaction terms. But such a model should highlight the extent to which Katrina and the casino industry have affected the states' economies.
Results
The full model uses data from AL, LA, MS, and TX, for January 1997 through February 2007. Hence, we have 42 observations on four cross-sections. Since there is a two-period lag for the personal income variable, the first two observations get dropped from each state. This leaves 160 observations in the model. The results of the model are shown in Table II[14] .
First notice that the state dummies reflect the different levels of personal income, as TX (the base state) has the largest weighted personal income, followed closely by LA; the personal incomes of AL and MS are significantly lower. Keeping in mind that Katrina and Rita damaged LA the most seriously, followed closely by MS, and AL and TX to a much less extent, the state dummy and Katrina interaction terms exhibit the expected signs and relative values. These variables confirm that LA suffered the most serious damage, followed by MS. AL's personal income was not significantly affected by Katrina. Unfortunately, good state-level quarterly data on federal aid and charities are not available, even for Katrina. However, one would expect a large inflow of aid accruing to LA and MS to have a direct or indirect impact on personal income. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (2005) notes that personal income data do include insurance settlements, but it does not explicitly explain how federal aid to individuals is reflected in personal income data. Presumably, any effects of such aid would be manifest in the personal income data. All lagged-period variables (personal income and casino revenue) are statistically significant, a reflection of the general economic growth and casino industry growth that was experienced during the sample period.
Finally, consider the casino revenue and post-Katrina £ casino revenue variables. Since the personal income and casino revenue data are weighted by the states' proportion of hurricane-affected counties, the interpretation of the casino revenue estimated coefficients is not straightforward. Rather than analyzing the monetary effects of these variables, we instead focus on the signs and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients.
The casino revenue variable indicates that, during the sample period the casino industry has had a positive impact on the states' personal income. This obviously applies only to LA and MS, as they are the only two states in the sample with commercial casinos. 
Market-based "disaster relief"
The interaction term between the post-Katrina dummy and the casino revenue variable is a measure of the impact casino gambling had on personal incomes in the wake of Katrina. Thus, it shows the impact of the industry above and beyond its "regular" effect. The strongly positive coefficient on this variable suggests that the casino industry has been effective "disaster relief," in terms of spurring personal income in LA and MS after Katrina/Rita. Indeed, this effect is stronger than the "regular" effect found in the model. Perhaps, this should not be surprising, considering the industry's extraordinary amount of capital investment, its strong labor demand, and its demand for other input resources, especially after Katrina/Rita. This result stands in stark contrast to the rather poorly rated response from FEMA and other government agencies [15] .
Conclusion
The effects of Hurricane Katrina have been well publicized. Few people doubt that the disaster was one of the most serious in US recent history. Unfortunately, the role that everyday market activity has had in rebuilding the devastated Gulf Coast economies has been completely ignored in the media and by politicians, and even by economists. Indeed, many people view the government as having a primary role in disaster relief, and view markets as requiring "guidance" by government, even in the face of enormous government failures.
In this paper, we extend our previous model of the casino-Katrina relationship, and highlight one industry that has had a significant impact on the Gulf Coast rebuilding effort. Our empirical results suggest that the commercial casino industry has had a significantly positive impact on state-level personal income in the Katrina-affected states of LA and MS. Our model does not tell us exactly how the casino industry rebuilding has led to economic development, but it is likely an amalgamation of capital and labor effects, and the attraction of tourism. In any case, the model does provide strong evidence that the industry helps to create growth, and does not simply "cannibalize" other industries.
These results confirm what economists already know: at the most basic level, economic activity is simply exchange. The form or type of business is not necessarily important, despite what critics of the casino industry might say. Although "big business" and "corporate America" are often seen as evil or taking advantage of consumers, to the contrary, they are critical to economic development. This study provides evidence of that importance in the context of casinos and the recovery from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
5. This is consistent with Schumpeter's concept of "creative destruction." 6. Slot revenues at racetracks (racinos) are omitted from this analysis. Indian casinos are not included because their revenue data are not publicly disclosed. However, based on our empirical results, we would expect Indian casinos to amplify the effects we find for commercial casinos. 7. We initially included FL in the study because it was affected by Katrina. However, after weighting the data, as described below, FL drops out of the model because it did not sustain significant damage. Another possible model would be to have four groups of states, two with casinos and two without, with one group of each type being affected by Katrina, and the other having not been affected. 8. For LA the data come from the Louisiana Gaming Control Board (www.dps.state.la.us/lgcb).
MS casino data are from the Mississippi Gaming Commission (www.mgc.state.ms.us). 9. We chose January 1997 as the beginning period of the sample so that any "newness" effect of the casinos, which were introduced in the early 1990s, would not be driving the results. 10. Weighting by the affected population would be difficult and imprecise, especially considering migration after Katrina. Weighting by the amount of aid received is problematic because such measures are not available quarterly. It is also questionable whether the monetary aid accurately reflects the severity of damage, as much of disaster relief may be motivated politically rather than by need (Sobel and Leeson, 2006, p. 61) . The FEMA designation for affected counties is probably the best available indicator of damage sustained. 11. See Granger (1980) on Wold's theorem; also see Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Enders (1995) . Walker and Jackson (1998, p. 54 ) also discuss this issue. 12. The Katrina dummy by itself would measure the Katrina/Rita impact on TX, the base state, and the one least affected by the storms. The presence of this variable in our model would change the interpretation of the other state/Katrina interactions so that they would then measure how each state's differential impact differs from the differential impact on TX personal income. This "difference in differences" interpretation is an unnecessary convolution as well as a rather meaningless distinction, and hence one which we eschew. 13. The post-Katrina dummy takes a value of 0 prior to March 2005, and 1 for March 2005 and after. 14. The Durbin-Watson statistic is 0.953. However, the statistic does not have the standard interpretation since we are using panel data. Any autocorrelation present would likely be due to the fact that the data for the different cross-sections are "stacked." Re-stacking the data in an alternative order would alter the Durbin-Watson statistic. The unit root test rejects the hypothesis of the presence of a unit root in the residuals. For brevity, summary statistics are not presented. However, these can be requested from the authors. 15. Alternatively, one could argue that because the states receive significant tax benefits, the governments had a strong incentive to get the casino industry back in operation. This might explain MS's law change which allowed for Gulf Coast casinos to be built on land.
